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Corrections; STEPHEN KREIBS, M.D., 
Physician Health Partners Agent of 
Record; P.A. BRIAN WEBSTER, 
Physician Health Partners (Ft. Meyers, 
Fl.); P.A. TEJENDER SINGH, Physician 
Health Partners; ARISTEDES 
ZAVARAS, Executive Director, CDOC; 
JOSEPH GARY FORTUNADO, D.O., 
Physician Health Partners; P.A. JOANN 
STOCK, Physician Health Partners; 
NURSE NANCY WHITE, Physician 
Health Partners; JOSEPH WERMERS, 
M.D., Physician Health Partners; CO 
ST. MARTIN, Colorado Dept. of 
Corrections; CO. REGINA JOHNSON, 
Medical Department Colorado 
Department of Corrections; CAPTAIN 
WEINGARDT, Colorado Department of 
Corrections; LT. MARK BOLD, 
Colorado Department of Corrections; LT. 
JASON ZWIRN, Colorado Department 
of Corrections; SHANE MCMAHILL, 
Colorado Department of Corrections; 
CATHIE HOLST, Manager of 
Correctional Legal Services, ADA 
Coordinator, AIC CDOC; ADRIENNE
No. 11-1450





Appellate Case: 11-1450 Document: 01018903260 Date Filed: 08/27/2012 Page: 2
JACOBSON, Legal Assistant AIC/ADA 
Coordinator CDOC; SGT. BECKY 
BALL, Colorado Dept. of Corrections; 
LT JIMERSON, Colorado Dept. of 
Corrections; MS. HAVERLY, 
LIBRARIAN, Colorado Dept. of 
Corrections; JON DOE AND JANE 
DOE, all in their individual capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
John Nasious, a Colorado prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district 
court’s judgment against him in his prison-conditions lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 
(ADA). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Nasious filed an amended complaint with four claims. On appeal, he focuses 
on two of those claims: a § 1983 claim alleging denial of medical treatment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment and an ADA claim alleging denial of the ability 
to participate in programs and services and/or discrimination against him because of
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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his disabilities. Because his opening brief fails to present sufficient argument 
regarding the reasons for granting judgment for defendants on the other two claims, 
he has waived any challenge regarding those claims. See Guttman v. Khalsa,
669 F.3d 1101, 1116 (10th Cir. 2012).
Nasious asserted his Eighth Amendment claim against certain defendants who 
were medical providers or their gatekeepers and against other defendants who were 
not involved with medical decisions. Nasious does not make any appellate argument 
regarding the dismissal of the allegations against the non-medical defendants. 
Therefore, we focus on the medical defendants. The magistrate judge recommended 
granting summary judgment to them because (1) the Eleventh Amendment barred an 
award of money damages against defendants in their official capacities, and 
(2) Nasious failed to establish any violation of his constitutional rights because he 
did not show defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. 
The district court agreed and adopted the recommendation. We review the grant of 
summary judgment de novo. See White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 366 (10th Cir. 
1996).
In his opening brief, Nasious argues he sustained injuries from defendants’ 
“failure to treat or admit his disabilities.” Aplt. Br. at 2. We agree with the 
district court that the Eleventh Amendment bars Nasious from recovering, under 
§ 1983, money damages against defendants in their official capacities. See White,
82 F.3d at 366. We also agree Nasious failed to show defendants were deliberately
- 3 -
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indifferent to his serious medical needs. Clearly Nasious disagrees with defendants’ 
medical opinions and their prescribed courses of treatment for his various conditions, 
but such disagreement fails to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); Perkins v. Kan. D ep’t o f Corr., 165 F.3d 803,
811 (10th Cir. 1999); Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993). At most, 
Nasious’s allegations of incorrect treatment might establish malpractice, which also 
fails to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106-07; 
Perkins, 165 F.3d at 811. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment for 
defendants on the Eighth Amendment claim for substantially the reasons stated in the 
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation filed on April 22, 2011.
Regarding the ADA claim, Title II of the ADA provides “no qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132. The magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment on the 
ADA claim because: (1) some of Nasious’s allegations were not cognizable under 
the ADA, (2) Nasious failed to provide any evidence of a qualifying disability, and 
(3) Nasious failed to produce any evidence he had been discriminated against because 
of a disability. With one exception with regard to photophobia, which we discuss 
below, the district court agreed and adopted the recommendation. The district court 
also held defendants could not be sued in their individual capacities under Title II;
- 4 -
Appellate Case: 11-1450 Document: 01018903260 Date Filed: 08/27/2012 Page: 5
Title II did not abrogate Colorado’s Eleventh Amendment immunity against money 
damages; and the majority of Nasious’s ADA-related allegations were conclusory 
and non-specific with regard to disabilities other than photophobia.1
Before this court, Nasious again argues he is disabled within the meaning of
the ADA. Because the events underlying Nasious’s suit straddle the January 1, 2009,
effective date of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat.
3553 (ADAAA), in which Congress provided for a broader construction of
“disability” than had previously applied, we shall assume solely for purposes of this
appeal that Nasious suffers from a disability. Instead, we affirm substantially on the
alternate grounds identified by the district court in its order filed on June 29, 2011.
As the district court stated, many of Nasious’s ADA-related complaints concern
defendants’ failure to provide him the medical treatment he desires. But the
ADA does not provide a remedy for medical negligence or a means to challenge
“purely medical decisions” regarding the propriety of a course of treatment.
Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. o f Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005); see also
Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating the ADA “would not be
violated by a prison’s simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled
prisoners. No discrimination is alleged; [plaintiff] was not treated worse because he
was disabled. . . . The ADA does not create a remedy for medical malpractice.”). To
1 Earlier in the litigation, the district court had dismissed the ADA claim against 
defendant Ritter in his individual capacity for failure to plead sufficient facts to 
establish an ADA violation. Nasious does not appeal that decision.
- 5 -
Appellate Case: 11-1450 Document: 01018903260 Date Filed: 08/27/2012 Page: 6
the extent that any of Nasious’s ADA allegations can overcome Fitzgerald, he failed 
to produce evidence to show defendants denied him access to a prison program or 
discriminated against him because o f  his asserted disabilities.
The district court made one exception to the grant of summary judgment on the 
ADA claim. It held Nasious could proceed with a claim that defendants Holst and 
Jacobson, in their official capacities, violated Title II by failing to accommodate his 
photophobia while he worked his prison job. The district court limited this claim to 
injunctive relief only, holding Nasious could not recover money damages. The 
claim, however, was never decided on the merits. While it was pending, Nasious was 
transferred from Sterling Correctional Facility to a halfway house. Because Nasious 
no longer worked at Sterling, the district court granted defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss the claim as moot. We review this dismissal for 
constitutional mootness de novo. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau o f 
Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1122 (10th Cir. 2010).
Nasious did not object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant the 
motion to dismiss. Under this court’s firm waiver rule, a failure to object to a 
recommendation waives appellate review. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 
659 (10th Cir. 1991). In response to a show-cause order issued by this court, Nasious 
asserted he had filed objections. Apparently they did not reach the district court.
With regard to nearly every other recommendation Nasious did file objections, so it 
was anomalous for him not to object to this particular recommendation. Thus, we 
accept his representation that he did try to file objections and consider this issue 
under the “interests of justice” exception to the firm waiver rule. See Casanova v. 
Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (10th Cir. 2010); Wirsching v. Colorado,
360 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2004).
- 6 -
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Nasious argues the claim is not moot because he remains in the custody of the 
Colorado Department of Corrections, and he “could end up back at Sterling 
Correctional, tomorrow, that quick.” Aplt. Br. at 3. But it is well-settled that a 
prisoner’s transfer out of a prison moots his requests for declaratory or injunctive 
relief against staff at that prison. See Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1311 
(10th Cir. 2010). In McAlpine v. Thompson, 187 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 1999), 
we applied this rule to a prisoner who was released on parole, holding, “the 
hypothetical possibility that [the plaintiff], a former inmate on supervised release, 
will violate the terms of that supervised release and be returned to the same prison 
and same conditions of confinement cannot save an otherwise moot claim for 
prospective injunctive relief relating to prison conditions.” We continued, “we are 
not inclined to speculate that [the plaintiff] will break the law or otherwise violate the 
conditions of the[] release agreement.” Id. at 1218. Similarly, we are not inclined to 
speculate that Nasious will violate the terms of his commitment to the halfway house 
and be returned to Sterling. The district court correctly determined the ADA claim 
for injunctive relief was moot.
Nasious also claims entitlement to money damages under United States v. 
Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), in which the Supreme Court held, “insofar as Title II 
creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that 
actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state 
sovereign immunity.” Id. at 159. A claim for money damages would survive
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Nasious’s transfer to the halfway house. But Nasious’s argument is unavailing, 
because the conduct underlying the claim against Holst and Jacobson would not 
establish an actual violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We have not considered the numerous documents attached to Nasious’s reply 
brief. He did not move to supplement the record on appeal, and even if he had, we 
would have denied any such request. The judgment of the district court is 
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Terrence L. O’Brien 
Circuit Judge
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